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Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community Development Finance
Ian J. Galloway
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco1
P
eer-to-peer (P2P) networks directly connect computer users online. Popular P2P platforms include eBay 
and Craigslist, for example, which have transformed the market for used consumer goods in recent 
years. Increasingly popular, however, are P2P lending sites that facilitate debt transactions by directly 
connecting borrowers and lenders on the Internet. In the summer of 2008, the Center for Community 
Development Investments assembled a working group of community development leaders, investors, and Pros-
per Marketplace, the largest P2P lending platform in the world, to discuss the potential community develop-
ment implications of the innovation. This working paper documents this discussion and explores P2P lending 
in greater detail.  Part I offers background on P2P and the state of the P2P lending industry; Part II outlines the 
potential community development finance implications of P2P; and Part III discusses the working group and 
next steps necessary to successfully marry P2P technology and community development finance.
PART I: Understanding Peer-to-Peer Lending
P2P Lending vs. Intermediated Lending
In many respects, (offline) P2P lending is the original lending model, involving a debtor and a lender negotiat-
ing credit terms favorable to both parties.2 In contrast, modern-day banks, credit unions, payday lenders, credit 
card companies, mortgage companies, and other intermediating institutions use standardized underwriting 
procedures and risk profiling algorithms to guide their credit decisions. There is a good case to be made for this 
intermediation. For one, interpersonal relationships can be time consuming and onerous to develop. For an-
other, people that have capital to lend may not know the people that need to borrow it. And finally, institutions 
tend to have the capacity to streamline the credit allocation process and take advantage of economies of scale. 
For these and other reasons, institutions can generally find and underwrite borrowers more cost-effectively 
than individual lenders. In exchange for lower transaction costs, however, sophisticated risk modeling is used 
as a primary basis for credit allocation. Institutional lenders rarely “get to know” borrowers, especially when 
it comes to consumer debt products like credit cards and student loans. Instead, most lenders assume sta-
tistically probable default rates and devise ways to limit their exposure. This has dramatically increased the 
availability of credit but, unfortunately, not for everyone.3 Borrowers with standard risk profiles have better 
access to credit than those that fall outside established risk profile parameters. This is largely because the 
modern institutional lending model is not designed to provide customized underwriting. In fact, customized 
underwriting is anathema to risk modeling—more heterogeneity means more variability and lower predictive 
power. As a result, many institutional lenders seek to limit their costs by rationing credit to statistically predict-
able borrowers.
1  My sincere thanks to Frank Altman, Matt Camp, Anthony Chang, Paige Chapel, Klaudette Christensen, Cathy Dolan, Leonard English, David 
Erickson, Art Fatum, Ed Giedgowd, Mary Kaiser, Chris Larsen, John Olson, Adrienne Penake, Ed Powers, Manjari Raman, Arjan Schütte, Ellen 
Seidman, Beth Sirull, Mary Tingerthal, and Scott Turner for helping me develop the ideas in this paper.  All mistakes and views herein are my 
own and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
2	 Thomas	Meyer.	“Financial	services	2.0:	How	social	computing	and	P2P	activity	are	changing	financial	research	and	lending.”	Deutsche	Bank	
Research. Available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000201284.pdf. 
3  This refers to the general (admittedly, not recent) availability of credit cards, mortgages, home equity loans, student loans, auto loans, and 
other lines of credit compared to times past. 2
Internet-based P2P Lending
With the advent of the Internet, online P2P lending has emerged as a credit alternative to the intermediated 
financial services industry. Beginning in 2005, P2P lending sites have cropped up all over the world—Kiva, Mi-
croPlace, Lending Club, Prosper, VirginMoney, Loanio, UniThrive, Pertuity Direct, Zopa, MyC4, and others. 
Currently a $647 million industry, online P2P lending is expected to grow to $5.8 billion by 2010.4 
P2P lending platforms differ dramatically in type and approach. Some connect borrowers and lenders directly; 
others connect them via a third-party intermediary. Some P2P sites allow lenders to set interest rates; oth-
ers preset rates based on historical performance and credit score. Many have charitable missions; others are 
strictly for-profit. Socially-motivated sites tend to promote microenterprise development in developing coun-
tries. For-profit sites tend to focus on domestic borrowers, offering unsecured consumer loans to students, car 
buyers, debt consolidators, and others who either do not want to use mainstream debt products or do not 
have access to them.
For the most part, Internet-based P2P lending functions on the basis of trust, albeit trust between people that 
have only met in cyberspace. P2P lending sites match individual borrowers with individual lenders. Borrow-
ers share information about themselves—both personal and financial—and lenders decide whether or not to 
contribute to their loan request. Every loan is underwritten by multiple individual lenders, each committing 
a fraction of the loan until it is funded in full. Once fully funded, the loan is originated and the lenders receive 
their pro rata share of the principal and interest payments until the loan reaches maturity or the borrower 
defaults. 
It is important to note, however, that P2P “lending” is somewhat of a misnomer. In fact, no platform allows 
lenders to lend directly to borrowers. Platforms either: (1) broker loan reimbursements through interest-free 
investments; (2) broker the sale of securities backed by their issuers; or (3) facilitate the origination of loans 
which are sold as securities to P2P investors who behave like lenders (and who may not even realize the nu-
ance). For clarity’s sake, P2P “finance” will be used in this paper to describe all three platforms.  
P2P finance platforms can be direct or intermediated when it comes to funding and pricing loans. For exam-
ple, Lending Club uses a direct funding model but an intermediated pricing model. Investors can directly con-
tribute to a borrower’s loan request on Lending Club, but the interest rate is set in advance. MicroPlace uses 
both an intermediated funding and pricing model. MicroPlace investors select from among an array of “rep-
resentative loans” that are originated by microlending partners in developing countries. MicroPlace investors 
invest in pre-priced securities backed by their issuers which, in turn, invest in the microlending institution that 
lends to the representative borrowers in the listing. Kiva also uses an indirect funding model and an interme-
diated pricing model. Kiva investors invest in loans already issued by microfinance lenders and, because they 
do not allow investors to earn a financial return, the pricing of the loans is preset at zero. Prosper uses both a 
direct funding model and a direct pricing model. Investors on Prosper facilitate the funding of loans and set 
their price through auction.
4	 Interview	with	Prosper	CEO	Chris	Larsen	on	July	23,	2009.		Source:	Celent,	a	research	and	consulting	firm	focused	on	the	application	of	
information	technology	in	the	global	financial	services	industry.3
Figure 1. P2P Pricing and Funding Models: Intermediated vs. Direct
Several states require P2P finance platforms to enforce a suitability test, based on income and net worth, on in-
dividual investors before they can purchase asset-backed securities online.5 Lending Club, for example, requires 
its investors to either: (a) have an annual gross income of at least $70,000 and a net worth (exclusive of home, 
home furnishings, and automobile) of at least $70,000; or (b) have a net worth (determined with the same ex-
clusions) of at least $250,000. In addition, no lender member may purchase notes in an amount in excess of 10 
percent of the lender member’s net worth, determined exclusive of home, home furnishings, and automobile.6 
Prosper has similar restrictions, with an additional proviso that allows California investors to invest up to $2,500 
without triggering the higher-income suitability requirements.7 Despite this notable (and partial) exception, 
however, the test limits the pool of investors to only a small, relatively wealthy, slice of the population. 
To date, only one platform, MicroPlace, has been granted approval from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) to sell third-party-issued securities to multiple individual investors on its site without triggering 
a suitability requirement. While this is a key regulatory achievement, it is important to note that securities 
sold on MicroPlace are backed by their issuer—not the lender or the end borrower. The SEC has yet to allow 
any P2P finance platforms to sell third-party issued securities backed by assets (loans) online. Such a platform, 
referred to in this paper as a P2P market for third-party issued loans, could “become an important link between 
financial companies looking for liquidity and consumer investors’ potentially vast pool of cash,” according to 
American Banker magazine.8 Unfortunately, until state regulators re-evaluate their position on P2P investor suit-
ability and the SEC re-examines its position on third-party issued security sales, P2P finance will likely remain 
a cottage industry with only moderate potential for growth.
State of the P2P Finance Industry
Four platforms have captured most of the American P2P finance market: Kiva, MicroPlace, Lending Club, and 
Prosper. Kiva and MicroPlace primarily deliver capital to low-income entrepreneurs. Lending Club and Prosper 
compete directly with traditional lenders in the consumer debt market. All four platforms emphasize the social 
component of the P2P lending process.
5  Suitability requirements only apply to investors purchasing asset-backed securities. Securities backed by their issuers or traded by authorized 
brokers (e.g., FOLIOfn Investments) do not receive the same regulatory treatment.
6  Lending Club’s prospectus is available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000095013408021116/f50667b3e424b3.htm.
































Founded:  2005 
Total Debt Issued:  $82,599,410 
Average Loan Size:  $157 
Min/Max Lender Yield:  0% 
Minimum Credit Score:   N/A 
Kiva Microfunds (Kiva) facilitates the flow of capital to low-income borrowers in developing countries. Kiva 
works with 107 microlenders (field partners) around the globe to channel capital from the developed world 
to capital-starved entrepreneurs in poor geographies.10 In 2005, Kiva became the first to use the P2P lend-
ing model as a microenterprise tool.11 Kiva investors commit to fund loans already issued by field partners in 
developing countries. Once a loan is fully funded the credit risk (and, in some cases, the exchange rate risk) is 
transferred to the Kiva investors that funded the listing. Contingent on repayment, the field partner returns 
the principal upon maturity. 
Kiva is not registered in the United States as a securities broker-dealer and therefore cannot offer investors a 
financial return. However, field partners such as the Alternative Association for the Integral Development of 
Women (ADIM) in Nicaragua can charge borrowers interest and the spreads they earn (in this case, on a zero 
percent cost of capital) are used to cover operating expenses and capital reserves.12 Some consumer advocates 
have criticized Kiva’s microlending partners for charging borrowers “predatory” rates of interest. Microlenders 
defend these high rates, 55 percent in the case of ADIM, as necessary to cover their relatively high transaction 
costs and projected loss rates.13 Kiva entered the U.S. microfinance market in June, 2009 when it partnered with 
Opportunity Fund, a microlender in San Jose. This move has generated some controversy among Kiva investors 
concerned that a domestic lending option will siphon investment away from borrowers in developing countries. 
Kiva’s CEO, Matt Flannery, and president, Premal Shah, explained that the move was intended to expand credit 
access for “low-income entrepreneurs [in the U.S.] who are often marginalized from the formal credit markets.”14
MicroPlace15 
Founded:  2006 
Total Debt Issued:16  Unavailable 
Average Loan Size:  $300 — $400 
Min/Max Lender Yield:17  1% — 6% 
Minimum Credit Score:   N/A
MicroPlace has brokered the sale of more than 30,000 microenterprise securities since 2006 and worked with 
microlenders in over 40 countries.18 Like Kiva, MicroPlace allows socially-motivated investors to fund microfi-
nance activity all over the world. Despite nearly identical mission statements, however, MicroPlace differs from 
Kiva in subtle yet substantial ways. 
9  Kiva statistics are available at http://www.kiva.org/about/facts/. Statistics are current as of July 20, 2009.
10  Ibid.
11  Kiva Facts, available at http://www.kiva.org/about. 
12  More information about the Field Partner ADIM is available at http://www.kiva.org/about/aboutPartner?id=120. 
13	 Jennifer	Coogan,	“Microlending	Takes	Off	on	the	Internet,”	The New York Times, January 7, 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-lend.4.9059149.html. 
14	 Andrew	Ross,	“Furor	over	Kiva’s	new	loan	policy,”	San Francisco Chronicle, July 9, 2009. Available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/c/a/2009/07/09/BUK518KLG6.DTL. 
15  Interview with MicroPlace’s Annie Lescroart on July 21, 2009.
16  MicroPlace does not share this information publicly.
17	 “Lenders”	on	MicroPlace	are	actually	investors	in	securities	issued	by	third	parties.
18  Lescroart interview.5
For one, as a registered broker-dealer, MicroPlace can offer investors a financial return. Investors can earn any-
where between one percent to six percent interest on their investments depending upon the microlending 
partner. Also significant is the degree to which the loans are intermediated. Contrasted with Kiva, which con-
nects investors with specific loans, MicroPlace investors purchase securities from issuers that invest in microfi-
nance lenders which, in turn, lend to low-income borrowers. The investor’s relationship with the end borrower 
is indirect and investors experience losses only if the security issuer defaults. To help protect investors, issuers 
keep reserves to back potential losses. As an example, securities offered by the Calvert Foundation (one of 
four issuers currently offering notes on MicroPlace) are senior to $13.9 million in program-related investments 
(PRIs) in Calvert from a variety of foundations, banks, and insurance companies.19 This high level of credit risk 
protection has resulted, thus far, in a perfect repayment rate to MicroPlace investors.
Lending Club20  
Founded:  2007 
Total Debt Issued:  $45,078,700 
Average Loan Size:  $8,626 
Min/Max Lender Yield:21  7.05% — 21.21% 
Minimum Credit Score:   660 
Lending Club has issued more than 5,200 loans since 2007.  Lending Club was the first P2P investment plat-
form to receive SEC approval to sell securities backed by loans. Despite this success, however, many state secu-
rities regulators still requires investors to meet high-income and net-worth minimums before they can purchase 
notes on the site. As discussed earlier, this “suitability test” is a major impediment to the continued growth of 
the P2P finance industry. 
According to Lending Club’s prospectus, its “obligation to make payments on a Note [is] limited to an amount 
equal to the lender member’s pro rata share of amounts we receive with respect to the corresponding mem-
ber loan for that Note.” In other words, investors commit to purchase notes that represent a fraction of a loan 
that has yet to be originated. Once investors commit sufficient capital to fund a loan request, Lending Club 
issues notes for each participating investor that represent their pro rata share. 
Importantly, and unlike MicroPlace, for example, Lending Club investors shoulder the full credit risk associated 
with the underlying loan. To assist investors with their due diligence, Lending Club has designed a proprietary 
social networking algorithm known as LendingMatch to automatically match borrowers with investors that 
share common characteristics. Presumably, the more similarities borrowers and investors share, the fewer 
the information asymmetries and the more accurate the credit risk assessment. In addition to LendingMatch, 
Lending Club uses a strict screening process to protect investors from risky borrowers. In fact, to date, Lending 
Club has declined more than 52,000 borrower applications.22 Requests that are approved are assigned a credit 
grade and a corresponding interest rate by Lending Club. Investors bid to fund the loan (purchase the note) at 
the preset rate. 
Borrowers can apply for loans ranging in size from $1,000 to $25,000 and investors can resell notes purchased 
through Lending Club on its Note Trading Platform, operated by FOLIOfn Investments, a FINRA/SIPC regis-
tered clearing broker-dealer. Lending Club was the first P2P finance platform to receive regulatory approval to 
operate a secondary market for notes issued on its site. 
19  Calvert Social Investment Foundation, Calvert Community Investment Note Prospectus, April 30, 2009, available at https://www.microplace.
com/shared/prospectus/cci_prospectus_2009_final.pdf.	
20  Lending Club statistics are available at https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action. Statistics are current as of July 20, 2009.
21	 “Lenders”	are	actually	investors	in	securities	issued	by	Lending	Club.	
22  Lending Club statistics, as of July 20, 2009.6
Prosper Marketplace23  
Founded:  2006 
Total Debt Issued:  $178,610,222 
Average Loan Size:  $6,172 
Min/Max Lender Yield:24  3.39% — 36% 
Minimum Credit Score:   640 
Prosper Marketplace (Prosper) is currently the largest P2P finance platform in the world. Since February 2006 
it has attracted more than 830,000 members (borrowers and lenders) and facilitated the origination of $178 
million in unsecured consumer loans. Prosper’s platform operates as a Dutch auction. In a Dutch auction, the 
seller starts the auction with a maximum price and multiple purchasers bid that price down until the good is 
sold or the auction times out. When posting a listing, Prosper borrowers set the maximum interest rate they 
are willing to accept and Prosper investors have fourteen days to bid that rate down. When the listing expires, 
the loan is originated and the pro rata notes are sold at the agreed-upon terms. If the loan is not fully funded 
after the fourteen-day listing period it is not originated and all bids on the loan are voided. 
Prosper’s auction process is unique among P2P finance platforms. Other platforms assign borrower listings a 
fixed interest rate and the bidding process is simply a matter of funding—or not funding—a particular loan. 
Prosper’s auction process allows lenders to make their own judgment about what rate is appropriate for a 
particular loan. Transparency is therefore crucial for the Prosper market to function properly. The more infor-
mation the investor has available, the better able they are to set an appropriate interest rate for the loan. In an 
effort to provide some underwriting guidance in the absence of a preset interest rate, Prosper incorporated 
an estimated-loss tool into the bidding process. This tool evaluates the default likelihood of a particular loan 
based on a range of financial and social criteria. Investors are free to heed this tool or rely on their own under-
writing skills as they bid. 
Like other P2P finance platforms, Prosper provides investors with both financial and nonfinancial information. 
Prosper contends that the added social element enhances the effectiveness of the underwriting process. Prosper 
investors can substitute social criteria for missing or incomplete credit data and borrowers can make a more com-
pelling case for their creditworthiness. For example, a graduating college senior with a short credit history could 
argue, as part of their loan listing, that a college degree should factor positively into their overall credit profile. 
Like Lending Club, Prosper offers a secondary market for loans originated on its site but, unlike Lending Club, 
the pricing of securities sold on the market is determined by auction. Also operated by FOLIOfn Investments, 
Prosper’s secondary market just received regulatory approval and thus has not yet brokered the sale of any 
Prosper notes. Prosper is also hoping to offer a nationwide P2P market for third-party issued loan sales.25 “The 
vision behind the development of Prosper’s Open Market initiative [a market for third-party issued loans] is to 
help fill a void left by the collapse in community development financing and the asset-backed securitization 
markets,” said Chris Larsen, CEO and co-founder of Prosper, in an interview.26 While Prosper just received ap-
proval from the SEC for the sale and trading of securities issued on its site, it has not yet received permission 
to allow its platform to be used for the sale of loans issued by third party lenders.
23  Prosper statistics available at http://www.prosper.com/invest/performance.aspx. Statistics are current as of July 30, 2009.
24	 Prosper’s	minimum-bid	floor	is	based	on	the	Prosper	Rating	assigned	to	the	listing	and	is	calculated	by	adding	the	national	average	
certificate	of	deposit	rate	that	matches	the	term	of	the	borrower	loan,	as	published	by	BankRate.com,	to	the	minimum	estimated	loss	rate	
associated with the Prosper Rating assigned to the listing, which is based on the historical performance of similar Prosper borrower loans. 
In this example, calculated on July 15, 2009, 3.39% is derived by adding the current average three-year CD rate of 2.39% to the one percent 
minimum expected loss rate of AA Prosper securities.
25  Prosper unveiled a P2P market for third-party issued loan sales in May, 2009 but it was limited to the state of California and was voluntarily 
shut down shortly after it launched. According to a statement issued by Prosper; “We have been overwhelmed by the outcry from potential 
investors around the country who want to participate in peer-to-peer lending. Therefore, after much consideration we have decided to 
voluntarily	shut	down	our	operation	in	order	to	complete	our	SEC	approval	for	a	nationwide	peer-to-peer	lending	platform.”	Statement	is	
available at http://www.prosper.com/help/topics/quiet_period.aspx.
26  Interview with Prosper CEO Chris Larsen on July 17, 2009. 7
PART II: Community Development Implications of P2P
Community Development Finance Challenges
The Center for Community Development Investments (the Center) has actively supported the growth of a 
transparent and efficient secondary market for community development loans. To that end, the Center has 
held several convenings and published frequently on the topic since 2005. The issue of how best to connect 
community lenders with investors has been a difficult one. Much of the Center’s focus thus far has been on 
securitization. Securitization allows lenders to pool assets of a similar type and sell pieces of the pool to inves-
tors. This spreads credit risk across multiple loans and reduces each investor’s exposure to discrete defaults. 
Investors can also buy a priority claim to the pool’s payment streams. Pools of securities can be layered, or 
tranched, by payment priority. Senior tranches pay out before junior tranches and they are priced higher. The 
risk diversification and tranching benefits offered by securitization allow lenders to sell a range of products 
that satisfy investors with different appetites for risk. 
The difficulty with securitization, with respect to community development, is that it relies heavily on the ho-
mogeneity of the underlying pooled assets. Unlike commonly traded assets, such as mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS), community development loans tend to be unconventional and difficult to pool. The capital markets 
value standardized, predictable assets; community development loans tend to be neither.27
Despite this securitization hurdle, specialized community lenders continue to finance projects that benefit 
low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities. Lenders such as community development financial insti-
tutions (CDFIs), community banks, community credit unions, and others take a “high touch” approach to 
underwriting and servicing.28 Community lenders tend to be more patient lenders, more willing to work with 
borrowers and accept late payments. The results have been striking. Community lenders routinely report loss 
rates of less than one percent. For example, the Low Income Investment Fund (LIIF), a CDFI with $562 million 
under management, has reported a capital-loss rate of only 0.12 percent, or one-eighth of one percent over 
its 25-year history.29 This comes as no surprise to LIIF president and CEO Nancy Andrews, who has argued for 
years that “weird, funky, nonconforming community loans” can be profitable.30 And she is not alone. Commu-
nity lenders across the industry report similar performance. 
Of course, the costs associated with providing a high-touch borrower relationship are high. Community lend-
ers depend heavily on subsidized capital to support their borrowers. For example, banks provide community 
lenders hundreds of millions of dollars of below-market capital every year to meet their Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA) obligations. Passed in 1977 to combat lending discrimination, the CRA is the driving regula-
tory force behind much of community development finance. Non-CRA-regulated institutions such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, and credit unions also play key roles in community development finance, but 
their participation is dwarfed by that of their bank counterparts. Public sources, such as the CDFI Fund, con-
tribute an important, but limited, amount of capital as well. 
27	 Laura	Choi,	“Creating	a	Marketplace:	Information	Exchange	and	the	Secondary	Market	for	Community	Development	Loans.”	Federal	Reserve	
Bank of San Francisco’s Working Paper Series: 2007–01. Available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2007/wp07-01.
pdf.
28	 For	purposes	of	this	paper,	“community	lenders”	refers	to	institutions	that	finance	community	development	projects.	




In practice, community development lenders can grow in three ways: they can borrow money, secure grant 
funding, or sell their assets into the capital markets for cash. While access to credit has been facilitated by 
federal regulation (i.e., the CRA) and some grant funding has been available, access to the capital markets, as 
mentioned earlier, has largely been a non-starter. This is due to a number of interrelated issues: (1) there is little 
reliable longterm community development loan performance loan data available; (2) there is a lack of stan-
dardization across the industry; (3) loan sizes tend to be too small to attract institutional investors; (4) there 
is insufficient loan volume relative to other asset classes; and, (5) despite abundant evidence to the contrary, 
there is a stubborn stereotype that loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers are inherently risky and 
must be discounted. As a result, community development loans have been difficult to securitize, pool, tranche, 
and price relative to more “plain vanilla” assets.31 
The result is unfortunate on two levels: investors undervalue community development assets and convention-
al lenders shy away from community development loans because investor demand is depressed. This self-per-
petuating liquidity logjam has a severely negative effect on community development activity. Adding to this 
challenge are the myriad public program-related rules attached to many community development loans. Not 
only do investors have to manage traditional sources of risk—interest rate, prepayment, credit, development, 
etc.—but community development investors have to manage compliance risk as well. Public program com-
pliance is usually based on rigid income restrictions. Making sure that property managers adhere to income 
guidelines can be labor-intensive and expensive, creating a financial disincentive to invest in a project. 
Despite these challenges, Community Reinvestment Fund, USA (CRF), a national nonprofit, has successfully 
pioneered a large-scale secondary market for community development assets.32 CRF purchases economic de-
velopment and affordable housing loans from community lenders and pools them into asset-backed securities 
and New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) investment funds. CRF tranches the pools and sells them to institutional 
investors through private placement. In 2004, this approach led to the first-ever community development debt 
offering to receive a public debt rating. In its 21-year history CRF has issued 20 notes, three affordable hous-
ing debt securities, and sold participation in seven NMTC funds.33 This success has come at a price, however. In 
order to overcome investor anxiety, CRF has had to credit enhance its offerings with below-market capital from 
foundations and charitable donors. While this subsidy-driven approach works, it is difficult to scale.
Limited access to the capital markets leads many community lenders to depend heavily on borrowed funds. 
Unfortunately, this increases their exposure to down-cycle economic risk. When the economy weakens, bank 
lending dries up, foundation giving contracts, and community lenders have nowhere to turn for new capital. 
This poses a particular challenge to community lenders trying to service struggling LMI borrowers because 
when workouts, principal reductions, and patience are most needed, community lenders are financially ham-
strung to provide them.34 
P2P as a Tool for Community Development Finance
P2P finance platforms are well suited to both originate and broker the sale of community development loans 
for a number of reasons. For one, they depend heavily upon transparency. For another, a P2P market for 
third-party issued loans, should the SEC permit it, would offer community lenders a much-needed source of 
additional capital. And finally, whether they broker the sale of securities or originate loans on-site, P2P finance 
platforms would allow investors to evaluate community development loans on a loan-by-loan basis at relative-
ly low cost. This may make community development assets more attractive to investors with little appetite for 
opaque pools of hard-to-price community development securities. 
31	 Choi,	“Creating	a	Marketplace.”
32  Community Reinvestment Fund, USA Quick Facts, available at http://www.crfusa.com/AboutCRF/Pages/QuickFacts.aspx.
33  Ibid.
34	 Nancy	Andrews,	“The	Economic	Crisis	and	Community	Development	Finance:	An	Industry	Assessment,”	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	San	Francisco	
Working Paper Series, June 2009.  Available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/wpapers/2009/wp2009-05.pdf.9
P2P finance platforms could also provide individuals a means, other than charity, to invest in their own neigh-
borhoods or causes that they care about (e.g., Gulf Coast recovery). Instead of waiting for large institutional 
investors to lead the neighborhood redevelopment charge, activist investors could provide much needed 
seed financing for all number of community development projects—new community facilities, affordable 
housing, school rehabilitation, street beautification, playground construction, etc. P2P finance platforms are 
naturally well-equipped to support these projects because they function at the intersection of finance and 
social networking.
Institutional investors may find P2P finance platforms useful as well. As mentioned earlier, CRA-regulated 
institutions invest heavily in community development assets. Because these assets can be difficult to identify, 
some banks invest in mutual funds composed of loans located in their LMI geographies. While participating in 
these funds can be less labor-intensive than ad hoc investing, banks pay a premium to farm their underwriting 
out to a third party. P2P finance platforms could offer a more cost-effective alternative.
PART III:  
Marrying Community Development Finance and P2P Technology
P2P Community Development Finance Working Group
The P2P community development lending working group was created in early 2008 by the Center for Commu-
nity Development Investments. The goal of the working group was to explore how P2P technology could be 






The working group met in August, 2008 to discuss P2P finance’s potential community development applica-
tions. The group was comprised of representatives from banks, foundations, pension funds, community lend-
ers, and industry trade groups. Prosper Marketplace, which had previously indicated a strong interest in the 
concept, provided the group with background on P2P finance and how its platform could be adapted for the 
community development industry. Several key themes emerged from the meeting, as described below.
Loan Size and Terms
The average P2P loan size is small—$8,626 on Lending Club, $6,172 on Prosper, and even smaller on the 
microfinance platforms Kiva and MicroPlace. Community development loans, in contrast, tend to be much 
larger—LIIF loans average $935,023, for example.35 The prospect of cobbling together enough individual 
investors to fund these loans worried many members of the working group. Different products were discussed. 
Some community development loans seemed better suited for P2P finance platforms than others. Predevelop-
ment loans, microloans, small business loans, and affordable housing working capital loans seemed to hold 
more promise than large construction loans (which constitute the bulk of community lending). Another op-
tion ventured at the meeting was to use P2P finance platforms to raise money for smaller projects that comple-
ment larger community developments. A playground on a new charter school site; a computer lab in an 10
employment resource center; a mural on a park wall—P2P investors could augment large projects with targeted, 
yet appropriately modest, funding commitments.
Loan terms were also a concern. Most P2P finance platforms offer a single product: a three-year fixed, amortiz-
ing loan. Designed to simplify the transaction for the lender and borrower, these terms do not mirror those 
typically offered by community lenders. Community development loans often have longer maturities, variable 
rates, and balloon payment terms. The group concluded that P2P finance platforms would have to offer a more 
diverse set of products to meet the unique needs of community development borrowers.
Underwriting and Servicing Challenges 
Underwriting community development loans takes special expertise. As discussed earlier, funding community 
projects is challenging and complying with public program rules can be complex. Lenders need to understand 
all projects risks, including compliance risk, and the recourses available to them should the project fail. Many 
members of the working group were concerned that laypeople may be ill-equipped to evaluate these risks and 
understand the complexities of community development lending. 
Servicing was also a significant concern. The group was committed to preserving the “high touch” relation-
ship that distinguishes community lending from conventional lending. Community development borrowers 
require active servicing.  While charge-offs and defaults are rare, forbearance and late payments are not. Any 
P2P finance platform used for community development must retain community-minded servicers to ensure 
that borrowers have sufficient flexibility to manage their debt payments. 
Choosing the Best Model: Direct vs. Intermediated, Lending vs. Investing
Many members of the working group expressed reservations about directly funding and directly pricing com-
munity development loans via P2P finance platforms. Are P2P lenders astute enough to underwrite uncon-
ventional community borrowers? Community development loans also tend to have low yields; are lenders 
and investors capable of pricing loans appropriately, as would be required with the direct pricing model? The 
answers to these questions, the group concluded, should dictate the degree of intermediation.
Generally speaking, the group preferred the P2P investing model to the direct P2P lending model, largely be-
cause it would potentially allow for third-party issued loans sales. If community lenders could use P2P finance 
platforms to sell their loans to investors, the liquidity benefits would be enormous. Furthermore, from the 
standpoint of the individual investor, no sophisticated underwriting skills would be required. Individual P2P 
investors that are uncomfortable underwriting community development borrowers could, instead, underwrite 
the lending institution and decide, based on historical loss rates and other considerations, whether to fund the 
listing. This would keep existing intermediaries—community lenders—in a position to capitalize on their skills 
as underwriters and preserve their close relationship with borrowers.
Sufficient Lender/Investor Demand
In general, the group concluded that small institutions with limited capacity have the most to gain from an on-
line community development loan market. CRA-motivated banks, foundations, pension funds, and individu-
als were all identified as primary potential users. 
To meet their CRA obligations, large and intermediate-small banks are required to invest in qualified CRA 
investments within their regulatory assessment areas. A searchable P2P finance platform, guided by carefully 
assigned social tags, would allow CRA-motivated banks to identify investments that meet their CRA require-
ments. For example, banks could limit their searches to loans originated by certified community develop-
ment lenders, such as CDFIs. Banks could easily identify particular types of loans as well: small business, rural 
35  Low Income Investment Fund Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.liifund.org/ABOUTLIIF/FAQ.htm#averageLoanSize. 11
development, community facility, etc. This would be particularly powerful if coupled with a tool to search for 
investments in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. A well designed search engine would allow 
CRA-motivated banks to quickly sort investments by qualified LMI census tract within their regulatory assess-
ment areas. While not all social investments would be CRA-eligible, such a system would allow banks to target 
investments that meet basic community development and geographic criteria.
Foundations and, in particular, small foundations, could benefit from a community development P2P fi-
nance platform as well. Small foundations are often held to strict operating expense limits intended to 
maximize corpus impact. Potentially, a P2P finance platform could enable small foundations with limited 
capacity to identify investment opportunities that otherwise may be too costly to search out. Many founda-
tions also have specific social goals: cure cancer, support early childhood education, help the environment, 
etc. Foundations could use such a platform to find investments that align with their mission. At a minimum, 
foundations could look to P2P finance platforms for program-related investments (PRIs). PRIs count against 
foundations’ annual disbursement requirements (five percent of total endowment) and can be below-market 
investments. To date, negative screening has been the most reliable way for foundations to ensure that their 
corpus investments do not undermine social mission. Screening is a blunt instrument, however. Foundations 
may appreciate greater transparency and control as they commit larger and larger portions of their endow-
ment in support of their missions.
Pension funds could use P2P finance platforms to find economically targeted investments (ETIs). Pension funds 
tend to be patient investors. Large pension funds like CalPRS and CalSTRS have capitalized on this competitive 
advantage by investing in underdeveloped neighborhoods decades before they are rehabilitated. In some 
cases, this approach has yielded strong financial returns and positive social outcomes. While it is likely that 
CalPRS and CalSTRS do not need an online marketplace to identify ETIs, small municipal pension funds may 
benefit. P2P finance platforms could offer a cost-effective way for smaller funds to identify and fund ETIs that 
would otherwise be difficult and costly to find.
There may also be significant individual demand for community development investments. International 
microfinance platforms like Kiva and MicroPlace have demonstrated success in connecting socially motivated 
individuals with wealth-building projects around the globe. If their success is any indication, asset-backed 
community development securities may be very popular among individual investors. As discussed earlier, 
this would provide community lenders an additional funding source beyond CRA-motivated bank borrowing, 
grants, and subsidized private placement debt offerings.
Potential for Fraud
P2P finance platforms rely heavily on borrower- and security issuer-created content. Unfortunately, these 
disclosures, while revealing useful information, also create an opportunity for fraud. For the most part, P2P 
finance platforms have no ability to confirm nonfinancial information provided on their sites. This is arguably 
the biggest weakness of P2P finance—it often places a heavy burden on investors with little formal investment 
experience to root out fraudulent borrowers and evaluate social and financial criteria accurately. 
Adequately Serving Community Development Borrowers
Risk profiling by conventional lending institutions renders some borrowers outside the financial mainstream. 
P2P finance would seem to be a solution to credit rationing, particularly given that many platforms empha-
size the social aspect of their lending models.  aving access to a more complete picture of a 
borrower (i.e., veteran, family provider, etc.) allows lenders 
 Furthermore, h
to more accurately evaluate their credit risk. Unlike 
credit card companies, banks, payday lenders, and other conventional lenders which depend heavily upon 
sophisticated risk models to estimate default probabilities, P2P investors evaluate risk on an ad hoc basis. This, 
theoretically, creates an opportunity to allocate credit to people outside the financial mainstream, such as low- 
and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers. 12
In practice and over time, however, P2P finance platforms have begun to screen out subprime borrowers. In a 
November, 2008 study of Prosper, for example, Freedman and Jin observed that “while it is tempting to expect 
P2P lending to alleviate credit rationing for near or subprime risks, we find Prosper evolving from a com-
prehensive market toward a market that primarily serves borrowers who have access to traditional credit.”36 
Driven partly by poor subprime loan performance and partly by Prosper’s new, higher, credit score minimum 
requirement, Prosper investors have begun to emulate conventional lenders: funding borrowers with more 
mainstream, predictable risk profiles. 
Figure 2. Prosper Credit Mix of Loans over Time (2006—2008)
Other P2P finance platforms have moved in a similar direction. Lending Club rigorously screens loan requests 
which results in a high loan request rejection rate. Lending Club CEO and founder Renaud Laplanche ex-
plained this approach in a 2007 interview; “As a way to help build confidence on the lenders’ side, we have 
decided to limit access to borrowers with at least a 640 FICO score and less than 20% debt-to-income ratio. 
This combination will result in low defaults and excellent net returns for the lenders. The flip side is that we 
have to turn down a fair number of borrowers.”37 Yet, by turning away so many borrowers (91 percent of ap-
plicants), Lending Club becomes harder to distinguish from conventional lenders which, like Lending Club, use 
a credit algorithm to whittle down loan applications and set pricing levels.38 Even Kiva, the only nonprofit P2P 
finance platform discussed in this paper, is being criticized for watering down its stated antipoverty mission by 
expanding its platform to the United States which, as critics point out, is the richest country in the world.39 For 
P2P finance to emerge as a viable community development tool, more must be done to reconcile the poten-
tial for social good with the realities of responsible investing.
36	 Seth	Freedman	and	Ginger	Zhe	Jin,	“Dynamic	Learning	and	Selection:	the	Early	Years	of	Prosper.com,”	University	of	Maryland	Department	of	
Economics, June 20, 2008.  Available at http://www.prosper.com/downloads/research/Dynamic-Learning-Selection-062008.pdf.
37  Allen Stern interview of Renaud Leplanche on August 6, 2007. Available at http://www.centernetworks.com/lendingclub-founder-and-ceo-
renaud-laplanche.
38	 To	its	credit,	Lending	Club	“open	sourced”	its	pricing	algorithm	to	preserve	a	high	level	of	transparency.	Daniel	Roth,	“Road	Map	for	Fi-
nancial	Recovery:	Radical	Transparency	Now!”,	Wired, March, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp_
reboot?currentPage=1.
39	 Andrew	Ross.	“Furor	over	Kiva’s	new	loan	policy.”	San Francisco Chronicle. July 9, 2009. Available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/c/a/2009/07/09/BUK518KLG6.DTL. 
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Changes P2P Finance Platforms Should Make Going Forward
Develop a Fractional P2P Market for Third-party Issued Loans
With respect to community development finance, a P2P market for loans issued by third-party lenders would 
be a significant improvement over existing platforms (which only broker the sale of loans originated on site 
or securities backed by their issuers). For one, “high touch” intermediation is critical to successful community 
lending, necessitating the presence of a skilled community lender.  For another, contingent upon SEC ap-
proval, such a market could offer community lenders a direct route to the capital markets which, heretofore, 
has proven elusive. Prosper’s Chris Larsen, for example, “looks forward to extending the Prosper marketplace 
to community development organizations and other financial institutions as soon as we complete the securi-
ties regulatory process.”40  
Preferably, a P2P market for third-party issued loans would allow for fractional investing as well. In fact, 
fractional investing—the ability to purchase a piece of a security and not a whole loan—is essential to the 
P2P finance innovation. Preserving this feature is particularly important for community development loans. 
Community development loans are often quite large and the P2P finance market for large community devel-
opment securities would be small relative to that for fractional investments. Fractional investing is also the 
key to successful diversification. P2P finance platforms are an alternative to the conventional diversification 
strategy—securitization, pooling, and tranching—but only insofar as they allow investors to purchase small 
pieces of multiple loans. A P2P market for third-party issued loans that does not allow fractional investing will 
substantially reduce diversification opportunities. 
Advocate for Regulatory Reform
The primary obstacle slowing the development of a fractional P2P market for third-party issued loans appears 
to be regulatory, not technological. This is largely because P2P finance platforms are prohibited from direct 
lending activities and, instead, are forced to broker the sale of securities representing shares of consumer loans 
(triggering state and SEC regulation). P2P finance platforms interested in community development lending 
would benefit from a regulatory regime better suited to their core function: the facilitation of credit, not secu-
rities brokerage. 
Create a Standalone Community Development Asset Class
While community development assets are used by some investors to protect against down-cycle economic risk, 
most community development investing is done for socially motivated reasons. Distinguishing community 
development assets from other investment types—debt consolidation, auto financing, etc.—is therefore very 
important. The easiest way for P2P finance platforms to effectively broker the sale of community develop-
ment securities is to create a standalone community development asset class. This would give investors a clear 
way to target investments that meet their social criteria. P2P markets for third-party issued loans, if developed, 
should also carefully vet community lenders to protect against fraud. The most efficient way to vet community 
lenders is to use a proxy test, such as CDFI certification (granted by the U.S. Treasury) or nonprofit tax status 
(granted by the Internal Revenue Service). Either measure would offer a reasonable guarantee to investors that 
the security being sold by the lender constitutes a legitimate community development product. 
Offer a Wider Range of Products
Today, most P2P finance platforms offer a single product: a three-year, fixed, unsecured, amortizing loan 
capped at $25,000.  To be attractive to the community development finance industry, however, they will have 
to allow for larger, collateralized loans with longer maturities and balloon payment options.  Standard P2P 
finance terms may be sufficient for small working capital loans and other, more modest credit products, but 
they are not consistent with the bulk of community development finance activity.
40  Interview with Chris Larsen on July 17, 2009.14
Adopt a Social-Impact Ratings System
Many P2P finance platforms have already developed their own credit ratings to complement borrowers’ credit 
scores. These ratings systems are designed to internalize important borrower information not normally cap-
tured by the credit bureaus. Similarly, a social-impact rating system would be a useful way to capture and 
convey important mission-oriented information to socially motivated investors. In fact, several social impact 
ratings systems already exist. For example, the CDFI Assessment and Ratings System (CARS), developed by 
the Opportunity Finance Network (OFN), evaluates the “Impact Performance and Financial Strength and 
Performance” of CDFIs.41 A ratings system, such as CARS, should be presented alongside financial metrics on 
P2P finance platforms that broker the sale of community development securities issued by community lenders.
Provide a Geographic Search Tool
Geography is an important consideration for many mission-driven investors. Banks, for example, are motivat-
ed by the CRA to invest in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The ability to narrow investment 
opportunities to those located in LMI census tracts would help attract banks and other CRA-regulated institu-
tions to P2P investing. Other investors, both institutional and individual, could benefit from this tool as well. 
Investors with a localized focus, such as small family foundations and small municipal pension funds, may 
want to use P2P finance platforms to target investments in very specific geographies—a task made considerably 
easier by geocoding the investments. Individual investors may also be motivated to invest in specific geog-
raphies, be it their own communities or those communities that have piqued their interest, such as the Gulf 
Coast or the Rust Belt. Community development is as much about place as it is about people. P2P finance 
platforms should provide the tools necessary to invest in both.
Changes Community Lenders Should Make Going Forward
Issue Smaller Loans with Shorter Maturities
Community development lenders tend to favor real estate projects over microfinance or small business bor-
rowers. This is largely due to the relatively high transaction costs associated with the latter. Nevertheless, if 
community lenders want to use P2P finance technology effectively, they need to offer products that meet the 
needs of P2P investors. This typically means smaller loans with shorter maturities. 
Originate-to-Distribute
Most community lenders earn the bulk of their revenue on interest-rate spreads. Very few lenders can generate 
sufficient loan volume to rely heavily on fee-based income. A P2P market for third-party issued loans would al-
low community lenders to sell their loans to P2P investors and quickly recoup the borrowed funds. This added 
liquidity creates an opportunity for community lenders to move away from their typical originate-and-hold 
model and toward an originate-to-distribute model, which would generate fee-based income. Of course, this 
need not be an either-or shift. To the contrary, community lenders would be wise to retain a diversified ap-
proach, generating a mix of spread-based and fee-based income; P2P finance platforms would simply be a new 
means of garnering the latter. 
Compile Loan-specific Social-impact Information
In general, most investors are reticent to take a below-market financial return without a corresponding “mis-
sion return.” That investor expectation will only grow in a P2P finance context. There is a good reason that ex-
isting P2P finance platforms advertise the social aspect of P2P lending: many investors are nearly as interested 
in social impact as they are in financial return. It is likely, therefore, that P2P community development invest-
ing opportunities will amplify this interest in mission. Should a P2P market for third-party issued loans emerge 
41	 Opportunity	Finance	Network’s	CARS	website	available	at	http://www.opportunityfinance.net/financing/finance_sub4.aspx?id=56.15
for community development securities, community lenders will be expected to provide detailed social-impact 
information on their loans. This high level of loan-specific information will be costly for lenders to compile 
and communicate effectively. Community lenders interested in selling their loans via P2P should consider this 
cost before pursuing it as a liquidity option.
Partner with Other Community Development Finance Organizations
Many different types of community development finance organizations work in concert to deliver capital to 
LMI communities. Several have already been mentioned, including banks, community lenders, credit unions, 
foundations, pension funds, insurance companies, and wealthy individuals. The use of P2P technology for com-
munity development presents new opportunities for collaboration. For example, community lenders may find 
that P2P investors are unwilling to pay what they perceive to be fair-market value for their community devel-
opment securities. Instead of selling their loans at a discount—or not at all—community lenders could partner 
with other community development finance organizations to create a credit enhancement for securities sold via 
P2P. Specifically, they could form a first loss reserve pool backed by subordinate equity-equivalent investments 
(EQ2s) or program-related investments (PRIs) as a way to engage investors with differing appetites for risk and 
impact. This is only one example of potential collaboration; many other partnership opportunities may develop 
as the technology matures and community lenders grow more comfortable with the technology.
Conclusion
P2P finance is representative of a growing interest in active, social investing. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke commented on this trend in a recent speech about CDFIs:
[The] cultivation of nontraditional funding sources might prove fruitful. Increased interest by 
socially motivated individual investors has expanded the pool of investment capital for com-
munity development. One CDFI [Calvert Foundation] has created a product similar to a mutual 
fund where individuals purchase ‘community development notes’ that are invested in com-
munity development organizations. The fund has raised capital from about 4,700 individuals 
and invested about $160 million; further, it has performed well, with an average three percent 
rate of return to investors and very low loss rates. Even during the recession, new investors 
have been drawn by the appeal of supporting low- and moderate-income communities while 
earning relatively good rates of return. Other developments, such as emerging peer-to-peer 
lending platforms, also hold promise.42 
While online platforms may never replace conventional lending institutions, such as banks, it is important that 
the community development finance industry be aware of this emerging technology. Moreover, P2P finance 
platforms will continue to evolve—allowing for third-party issued loan sales, for example—which may funda-
mentally alter the way credit is allocated in the future. In either case, the potential community development 
finance implications are too significant to ignore.
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42  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. Speech delivered on June 17, 2009 at the Global Financial Literacy Summit in Washington, DC, avail-
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